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The virtuous spy: privacy as an ethical limit
Anita L. Allen
Introduction
You suspect something amiss is going on behind your back. Or maybe you know something is
going on, but you are not sure of all the details. You want the full story, and you know one
way to get it. You could spy. Is there any reason not to spy on other people as necessary to
get the facts straight, especially if you can put the facts you uncover to good use?
To "spy" is secretly to monitor or investigate another's beliefs, intentions, actions, omissions,
or capacities, especially as revealed in otherwise concealed or confidential conduct,
communications and documents. By definition, spying involves secret, covert activity, though
not necessarily lies, fraud or dishonesty. Nor does spying necessarily involve the use of special
equipment, such as a tape recorder or high-powered binoculars. Use of a third party agent,
such as a "private eye" or Central Intelligence Agency operative is not necessary for
surveillance to count as spying.
By "spying" I mean something different from unwanted open surveillance of people who know
they are being observed or investigated; and I mean something different from openly prying
into others' affairs by plying them with meddlesome questions. Like spying, open surveillance
and prying raise moral concerns. Notably, all three--spying, open surveillance and prying,
potentially interfere with expectations of privacy. People want to be let alone. But spying is
morally troublesome both because it violates privacy norms and because it relies on secrecy
and, perhaps, nefarious deception.
Contemporary technologies of data collection make secret, privacy-invading surveillance easy
and nearly irresistible. For every technology of confidential personal communication-telephone, mobile phone, computer email--there are one or more counter-technologies of
eavesdropping. But covert surveillance conducted by amateur and professional spies still
includes old-fashioned techniques of stealth, trickery and deception known a half century ago:
shadowing by car, peeking at letters and diaries, donning disguises, breaking-and-entering,
taking photographs, and tape recording conversations. The ethical examination of spying
cannot be reduced to a conversation about reigning in the mischief potential of twenty-first
century technology. We do need to concern ourselves with what tomorrow's spies will do with
nanotechnology, but plenty of spying is possible with the time-tested techniques of the Baby
Boomers, or even, for that matter, the Victorians. (1)

The philosophical problem I wish to consider here is the ethical limits of spying on others,
when the reasons for spying are good. I want to explore the plausibility of three interrelated
ideas. The first idea is one I will call the anti-spying principle: spying on other adults is prima
facie unethical. Spying ought always to be approached with caution and circumspection.
Regardless of its motive, spying carries an ethical cloud. Spying is like cheating. It exploits
confidence in the rules of the game. Spying inherently involves taking advantage of those who
place their confidence in the social norms that shape a cooperative communal life. Spying
should be presumed wrong because it often uses secrecy to unfair advantage and interferes
with the enjoyment of beneficial modes of personal privacy that individuals expect others to
respect. The second idea is an exception to the anti-spying principle: spying on others is
ethically permissible, even mandatory, in certain situations, where the ends are good. In the
situations I have in mind, spying is prompted by genuine obligations of caretaking, defense of
others or self-defense. Having to spy can make a person uneasy. Yet spying can be a good
way to take care of your children, yourself and the people for whom you are professionally
responsible. As I have argued elsewhere, privacy is extremely important, but it is not
everything. (2) The third and final idea is a constraint on exceptions to the anti-spying
principle: where spying is ethically permitted or required, there are ethical limits on the
methods of spying. The virtuous spy will violate privacy and transparency norms, of course;
but he or she will, to the extent possible, continue to act with respect for the moral autonomy
and for the moral and legal interests of the investigative target.
Surveillance professionals confront the complex ethics of spying all the time. Yet the ethics of
spying is not a subject matter solely for surveillance professionals, who surely ought to think
hard through questions of right and wrong tied to their work. (3) All of us are potential spies-every parent, lover, neighbor or employer. The questions "when is it ethical to spy on other
people?" and "what is the ethical way to spy, when spying needs to be done?" are of general
interest and importance. So, I address them here.
1. Spying for selfish self-interest
Plato broached the ethics of spying in Book II of the Republic. In conversation with Socrates,
Glaucon relates the fable of Gyges, a poor shepherd in the service of a king. Glaucon uses
Gyges' tale expecting to score points against Socrates. He challenges Socrates to deny that
the so-called just man would behave unjustly if his wrong-doing were undetectable.
The fable went like this. (4) A violent storm left a gapping chasm in the earth. Gyges
abandoned his flock, venturing down into the wide chasm. There he discovered a large brazen
horse, outfitted with a door. Gyges opened the door and resting inside found a naked corpse
with a ring of gold on its finger. Gyges took the ring and put it on. Later, when he and the
king's other shepherds had gathered to prepare their upcoming report, Gyges discovered
sitting there that, with a simple turn around his finger, the ring made him invisible. He began
to play with the ring, beaming himself in and out of visibility. Ambition set in. Gyges used the
power of invisibility to spy on fellow shepherds. Gyges repeatedly employed the information
gleaned through the power to make himself invisible to his advantage. First, he manipulated

his peers to get himself appointed an envoy to the king. Next he seduced the king's wife under
his nose, killed the king, and grabbed the royal powers and purse.
Glaucon urges by fable that the apparently "just" man would use powers of invisibility
opportunistically to spy on others and then to commit immoralities and crimes. So-called just
men and women will set aside moral ideals if they can do so without detection. Everyday
experience suggests that Glaucon was a keenly accurate psychologist. Philosophers disapprove
dishonesty, unfairness and murder. But Glaueon understood that like sex and influence,
knowledge of others is something humans naturally crave. It is ordinary to wonder: what do
they say and do when I am not in the room?
Wonderment does not entail a right to know or harm. The psychological inclination to spy
should be constrained by ethical discipline. At first Gyges was a recreational spy. Like all
spying, recreational spying carries an ethical cloud. It has a point, though--it satisfies idle,
even prurient curiosity. When they get caught, recreational spies may incite the fury of their
victims. The expression "curiosity killed the cat" rings false to contemporary ears, though.
Keep it to yourself and recreational spying can be as safe as it is easy. The voyeurs who
purchase the night-vision gear at their local retailer are hardly taking their lives into their own
hands.
In time, Gyges was not content to be a recreational voyeur. Selfish greed set in, and with it
unjust dreams and plots. Increasingly his spying became a tool of immorality and crime.
Gyges tale potentially sours moralists to the whole idea of spying. But surely there is a
defensible role for rings of Gyges. Sometimes, for limited purposes, responsible moral agents
should be willing to make themselves the invisible monitors of others.
2. Protecting your children
In 1971, the British philosopher H. J. McCloskey discussed the ethics of spying as part of his
effort to assess the sense in which privacy can be coherently understood as a political ideal.
(5) McCloskey defended spying on one's children for their own good. Specifically, he defended
spying on young daughters to protect them from older male seducers. His example may look
quaint today, but McCloskey correctly identified a category of exception to the anti-spying
principle: justified parental paternalism.
A. Spying on your children
Trying to find out what is going on behind one's back is potentially unethical, and, depending
upon the means used, potentially illegal. But one context of often permissible spying is
parenthood. McCloskey mounted a defense of paternalistic spying on one's own children that I
can build on.
Children typically lack the understanding needed to protect their own long-term interests.
They can be illogical and poorly informed. They commonly give priority to short-term desires
and peer approval. They lack judgment. They are easily victimized. Adult caretakers therefore

play a vital role in the protection of children. Parents are justified in finding out whether their
children are engaging in seriously unsafe behavior. The use of subterfuge, if needed, is
warranted. Invading privacy to find out what one needs to know can be a matter of
responsible parenting.
It was stunning to discover a number of years back that the parents of the teens involved in
the infamous Columbine High School massacre had no idea their sons maintained weapons
caches in their well-kept middle class homes. (6) Many parents view their teens' possessions
and bedrooms as off-limits private space. Columbine and similar incidents around the country
point to why parents are justified in inspecting teenagers' rooms for signs of trouble, though.
Serious risks of suicide, violence against others, substance abuse, mental illness or sex abuse
are grounds for intensely monitoring one's children. (7)
Even poor eating habits can be grounds for monitoring some children. According to
researchers, childhood obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the United States. (8) The
number of obese and morbidly obese children has risen dramatically in the past ten years. It
happens that in some American school districts, parents can log onto a website called
"myschool.account.com" and find out exactly what their children have purchased for lunch.
Every food item a pupil purchases from funds parents deposit in a lunch account is entered
onto an electronic log by type, time and date. Parents can request that their children not be
permitted to make cash purchases, thereby forcing children to buy only through their
monitored lunch accounts. At some schools, young children are not permitted to share food
because of allergy concerns. So the food they buy is pretty much the food they eat.
Monitoring someone's personal behavior, even a child's, can feel uncomfortable. But becoming
Big Brother of the lunch room can help a parent appropriately adjust meals eaten at home to
reduce caloric intake while respecting the nutritional pyramid, thereby improving health. A
parent with a seriously overweight child is justified in closely monitoring food choices, and
secretly so if necessary. I would go further: the parent of a child with a weight problem that
has reached medical proportions should take advantage of technology to get a grip on the
situation and take charge of it. A better Gyges would have used his ring to invisibly ease his
children's suffering.
Weight gain in the freshman year of college is a documented phenomenon, but parents are
morally less responsible for their adult children and less entitled to monitor. (9) And even if
hubby is chubby, his spouse should find other ways to encourage better food selections. If the
technology were in place to allow for spying on spouses as they worked or traveled,
nonconsenting adults are generally off limits for the paternalism I am defending.
A moral bias against paternalistically spying on adults follows from widely shared premises of
adult moral autonomy. I can imagine two situations, though, when spying on other adults
would be warranted. One is when spying has been solicited--that is, the spying is consensual.
For example, your intimate friend says: here is a key to my apartment; come by unannounced
and go through my things whenever you can to make sure there's no sign I am backsliding on
my commitment to give up substance abuse. Another example is when a helpless adult for

whom you are responsible suffers from a mental illness or a disorder like Alzheimer's and
needs to be monitored for their own safety and good. Spying to make sure the bills are getting
paid, and the doors are getting locked is an act of love and affection.
The example McCloskey used three decades ago to defend his belief that spying on minors is
acceptable reflects the moral preoccupations of another, patriarchal era: the sexual seduction
of young daughters by older men. Reconsidering the example exposes the normative
complexity of the case for parental spying, and indeed all spying aimed at protecting persons
from harm. We want our safety and well-being. However, what constitutes safety and wellbeing is highly contestable and evolves over time. And what extremes of spying behavior are
deemed ethically acceptable to achieve protective goals is also contestable and subject to
evolving standards.
McCloskey argued that minors can be protected from their own immature acts. Using the same
example, he argued that legal wrongdoers, including seducers, are not entitled to freedom
from spying eyes--lawbreakers have no genuine right to privacy:

People are thought to have a right to privacy in respect of the
affaires [sic] they have.... Yet I suggest that if the girl
involved in the affaire [sic] is a minor, a father who spied on the
pair could not be charged with an improper invasion of their
privacy; and if the man involved knew she was a minor, he could not
complain that he had suffered a loss of privacy as a result of the
father's spying, because by his actions he had put that area of his
life outside the area of privacy. (10)
The wrongness of "seduction" gives neither the minor daughter nor the seducer legitimate
moral grounds for complaint against fatherly spying, McCloskey contended.
It is not clear whether McCloskey's concern was that the seducer is liable for tortuous
"alienation of affection" or for criminal statutory rape. The alienation of affection tort which
once allowed British and American men to recover monetary damages when another man won
the sexual affections of his wife or daughter is virtually dead. (11) Were McCloskey writing
today, he would surely reframe the father's right to interfere through spying more distinctly
around the legitimate parental concern in stopping statutory rape and child abuse. There is no
privacy right to exploit, abuse or rape children.
A man having an affair with an underage girl needs to be caught and stopped. But how far can
a suspecting parent go to protect their child? Confronting the possible offender is fine, along
with reporting suspicions to the police. Going to the offender's home to interrupt a tryst seems
reasonable, too. But what about breaking into the offender's house when no one is there to
collect his diaries and journals, thinking they might detail the affair? Or bugging the office of
the offender's psychotherapist hoping to hear and tape an admission? Is journal theft and
bugging permissible spying because the offender qua offender has no legitimate expectation of
privacy?

Contrary to McCloskey, I would assert that wrongdoers do have some legitimate expectations
of privacy, the clearest being the confidentiality of the wrongdoers' relationships with their
therapists and lawyers. (A separate question is whether the psychotherapist or lawyer will
have a legal and moral duty to report confessed child abuse. (12)) It does not follow from the
offender's having no privacy rights and expectations in the affair, that break-in and bugging
by a suspecting father are ethically warranted. The protecting-persons exceptions to the antispying principle are not "by any means necessary" rules. Just because someone has robbed
millions from a bank, it does not follow that any effective means of extracting proof will be
warranted--torture, for example, would be unethical. There are limits on the spying that is
permissible when spying is ethically permitted or mandated to protect a child.
B. Spying on others
In McCloskey's example, spying on one's child entailed spying on the intimate affairs of an
adult wrongdoer. This led McCloskey to address the issue of whether spying on the private
sexual affairs of adults is ever warranted. Yes, spying is warranted, he concluded, because
sexual wrongdoers have no genuine privacy interests in their intimate behavior. I think a
better view is that the sexual offender has legitimate privacy expectations and interests, but
that not all of them would be wrongly breached by spying. Wrongdoers are entitled to their
confidence in the rules of the game, like everyone else.
Now imagine an example in which a zealous parent sought to protect his child by spying on
the intimate affairs of an adult whose conduct is not a direct threat to the child, or a threat at
all. Spying on third parties to protect one's child can be difficult to justify if it is not clear that
the child's safety and well-being are significantly at risk. And the right or obligation to spy
does not justify "by any means necessary" spying. I offer a real example, from Mississippi in
the late 1990's to get at the issues.
Glenn Michael filed for custody of his six-year-old daughter, who lived with his ex-wife and her
friend, Rita Plaxico. (13) Mr. Michael came to believe living with him was in the girl's best
interest after he heard that his ex-wife was having a lesbian affair with her roommate. He
surmised that the family court would view a heterosexual father as the better parent if he
could produce strong evidence of his ex-wife's homosexual affair. One night Michael drove to
the home shared by his ex-wife and Plaxico, sneaked up to a bedroom window, and observed
the two women unclothed and having sex. Pleased by his good luck, Michael grabbed a
camera from his car and snapped some semi-nude images. After presenting the photographs
to the court, Michael won custody of his daughter. Ms. Plaxico, who had not been a party to
the child custody matter, sued Mr. Michael for invasion of her privacy, but lost. Wrongly, in my
view, the court concluded that, under the circumstances of parental concern about an "illict"
relationship, spying was not unlawful, but "privileged." On appeal, a second court agreed that
Plaxico had no case, arguing that the spying was lawful because it was neither "highly
offensive to the ordinary, reasonable man" nor "bad faith ... utterly reckless prying." (14) Two
of the appellate judges thought the majority got the law wrong and dissented.

Had Mr. Michael simply been a recreational peeping-tom, content to peer and move on, he
never would have made the law books. But for Michael spying amounted to much more than
an idle amusement. He perceived spying as a practical way to protect his child. He spied, he
documented his findings, and he shared them with his attorney, the people he spied on, and
with the family court.
Spying is commonly called for by responsible caretaking, as Michael intuited. But Michael
acted unethically. Like Michael, many people are prompted to spy to protect dependent
children. Such motives alone do not categorically justify spying, or all methods of spying. The
adult lovers Michael spied on had an expectation of sexual privacy in their own home. He
violated that expectation and the boundaries of property and manners that normally protect it.
He cheated. He broke the rules of the game.
The problem of contested and evolving values was at work implicitly in Michael's case.
Americans disagree about whether having a gay parent is a threat to a child's well-being.
Some Catholic agencies refuse adoptive services to gay couples. Would an interest in
heterosexual parenting warrant spying on a mother's intimate life in ways that otherwise
grotesquely violate privacy norms? Even assuming, arguendo, that Michael would have made
the better parent, whether because of his sexual orientation or for some less bigoted reason,
he should have tried to protect his daughter from the perceived risk of harm through fairer,
less secretive, and less invasive means.
Getting to fundamentals, Michael's case illuminates the good sense of an anti-spying principle
in a liberal democratic society. We are committed to tolerance and self-determination. We
agree that privacy is important, and know that individuals disagree about what should go on in
private life. To spy readily or aggressively in order to expose people engaging in controversial
intimate conduct undercuts the very idea of a private life embodied in the social norm of
domestic privacy. Perhaps to an extent Michael believed his ex-wife was entitled to her private
life, as long as it did not involve their minor daughter. After all, he did not call the police
looking to get his ex-wife prosecuted for sodomy. (15) At the time Mississippi law criminalized
consensual sodomy, laws struck down in 2003 by Lawrence v. Texas. (16)
In some instances, prying and open surveillance are ethically less offensive alternatives to
spying. Suppose that instead of spying, Michael had resorted to prying and moral suasion. In
fact, he might have asked his ex-wife about her reported lesbian sex life and tried in good
faith to persuade her that, as a heterosexual, he would be the better custodial parent. I
suspect many ultra-liberals would judge Michael badly for meddling in that way. But moralists
of any stripe should judge him badly for becoming a trespasser, peeping Tom and
surreptitious photographer of sexual intimacy. Michael's conduct would have been especially
offensive if it was hypocritical--if he didn't have a problem with his ex-wife's sexuality at all,
but sought to exploit the social conservatism of the Mississippi courts to gain control over his
daughter.
3. Protecting yourself

Covert activity aimed at protecting yourself from others' wrongdoing is often both lawful and
ethical. Threats and extortion may justify surveillance tactics. (17)
Several decades ago, in McCloskey's time, men worded about playboy seducers of married
women and daughters. Men also were on guard against undeserving women "with a past"
trying to snare unsuspecting mates. McCloskey argued that spying is justified to protect
oneself from dishonest lovers. Again, his examples are dated, but his core principle is sound.
A respectable man is interested in marrying a woman, but suspects she may have an out-ofwedlock child stashed away somewhere. According to McCloskey such a man can with "no
invasion of her privacy" check up on her behind her back. (18) Similarly a Catholic man
interested in marrying a woman who may be concealing the fact that she has been previously
married and divorced, would not be invading her privacy if secretly he made the relevant
inquiries. For McCloskey "the test here would seem to consist in whether the person has a
right to know." (19) But this is only his initial conclusion. He eventually concludes that love
itself is why a man may investigate a beloved who loves him back. There is no privacy in love.
The moral right to know, can conflict with the moral right to privacy. McCloskey did not fully
consider the possibility that there could be a right to know, but that ethics would limit how far
one can go to acquire knowledge. But he shifted quickly, in any case, from a justification for
spying based on a right to know, to another interim justification, based on consent. The
woman on whom the man spies has freely engaged in some activity that amounts to ethically
valid waiver of the moral privacy rights. Shifting again, McCloskey suggests that voluntary
intimate interpersonal relationships are constituted by mutual accountability. And love, he
urges, demands the most accountability of all. Against her man, a woman in love and seeking
marriage has no privacy interests. Deep mutual knowledge is her interest. The target's loving
relationship with the spy, and the accountability it assumes, is what ethically justifies the spy's
secret and intrusive inquiries about her past:

Yet love, and like it respect for persons, may dictate invasions of
privacy. The lover, because of his love, wants to know all about
his loved one, because he loves her, and wants to know her more
fully as the person she is.... Love, and equally respect for
persons, may dictate the seeking of knowledge against the wishes of
the person concerned. The lover ... may suspect that she has a
serious disease and is afraid to have it diagnosed and treated, and
know that if it is ... it will not be fatal. (20)
I have defended accountability norms elsewhere, arguing that relationships of mutual
dependence, which include love affairs, can give rise to strong obligations of accountability.
(21) Lovers can indeed be accountable to one another. Accountability demands a
performance, and what performance is demanded is highly context dependent. The generic
categories of performances include the providing of information, explanations, and
justifications, as well as submitting to sanctions and transparency. (22)

A woman's having an accountability obligation to a man grounded in a mutually reciprocal
interdependent romantic relationship entities the man to accountability performances from the
woman, and vice versa. In the case of a couple engaged to be married, that might mean that
the partners are entitled to information and explanations about their pasts, and a reassuring
degree of transparency about their present life and future plans. However, we need an
argument to conclude that a lover has a right to sneak around and spy if his partner fails to
perform or credibly perform the required accountability practices. By analogy: a worker is
entitled to an annual wage statement; but if her employer fails to provide one by the date it is
due, she is not entitled to break into the employer's files to snatch information or documents.
She is entitled to demand the statement and ask for an explanation for why it has not been
issued, when it will be provided and whether systems are in place to make sure the same
problem does not arise next year.
Of special concern in the context of intimate relationships is a role for trust. A possibility worth
considering is that lovers are supposed to tell all, and then have the tales they tell be
believed. But if spying between lovers is justified by accountability, we still need some notion
of what limits on spying might apply to the situation. Are only "discrete" inquiries permitted?
Do theft of diaries and bugging go too far? What about tracking down your beloved's elderly
aunt in a nursing home and grilling her about your beloved's past? Things could get
dangerously out of hand.
McCloskey's suggestion that an ethic of love inherently entails an entitlement to spy is
intriguing. What seems clearer to me is that protecting oneself from harm can warrant spying,
and that unfortunately the people able to do us the most harm are sometimes our own lovers
or spouses. Contemporary couples in intimate relationships have unromantic, practical
grounds for spying. Spying on a spouse or lover may be a demand of responsible selfprotection. The people with whom you share intimacy have unique capacities to bring you
down, giving rise to rights of ethical spying. You may turn the ring of Gyges to protect your
children, but also to protect yourself from undeserved humiliation and ruin.
This point is well-illustrated by the strange case of Jeanine Pirro and her husband Albert Pirro.
The Pirros were once one of New York's most infamously dysfunctional married couples. (23)
Albert Pirro was not a very nice man when it came to his wife of many years, Jeanine. He was
a classic louse. He was guilty of dating-while-married. He was unfaithful and sued for
paternity. A zoning lawyer and real estate hot shot, he cheated on the family taxes, tricking
his wife into signing fraudulent tax forms. He got caught and was convicted of a felony. Having
an unethical felon for a husband was doubtlessly embarrassing to Ms. Pirro, a smart, witty,
attractive lawyer. Ms. Pirro was well known in Westchester County, New York, where she
served three terms as the District Attorney.
Ms. Pirro became a Republican candidate for the Attorney General of New York in 2006. She
believed she had a shot at becoming the first woman in history to hold the post. A couple of
months before the election Pirro revealed under pressure that she had tried to hire someone
to spy on her husband. Pirro felt she had had to consider spying to find out if her husband was
having an extramarital affair with one her friends. She knew A1 was dishonest about such

things and that she could not trust his denials. Her hope was to make any such affair public
before someone else did, catching her unawares on the eve of Election Day, ruining her
chances for victory. Something similar had happened once before. Pre-election news reports
that her husband had mob ties thwarted her bid to become lieutenant governor. She had had
to pull out of the race.
On these facts, Ms. Pirro seemed justified in spying on her husband. I offer the Pirro case as
an example of a situation in which donning and spinning the Ring of Gyges may pass moral
muster on grounds of self-protection. But Ms. Pirro made some mistakes commonly made by
people who set out to spy.
First, she picked the wrong spy. Ms. Pirro approached a man of doubtful character to help her.
Since there are ethical (and legal) limitations on spying, choosing a person of doubtful
character to do your spying is itself ethically blameworthy. Ms. Pirro admitted to exploring
bugging her husband's private yacht with Bernie Kerik, a security consultant who was a
disgraced former New York police commissioner. Spying is "shady" because it is covert, but it
should not be "shady" in the sense that it is conducted by unethical professionals using
unethical techniques.
Second, Ms. Pirro picked the wrong technique of spying, relative to her information need. It is
not clear that "bugging" would have violated state or federal law. The laws against wiretapping
and eavesdropping, include intrafamilial and other potentially relevant exceptions. (24) Still,
there are ethical concerns about the methods she considered. She needed to establish the fact
of an affair, but the method of spying she fixed upon would have extensively exposed the
personal conversations of anyone visiting the yacht. Bugging the boat would have resulted in a
common problem with spying, namely, an over-collection of personal information. Collecting
more personal information than needed makes spying more invasive of privacy than it has to
be.
4. Protecting the company
The anti-spying principle is called for by the love of openness and privacy, and the large
number of ways in which, when pursued in a world of fallible judgment and culture wars,
spying can go wrong. The anti-prying principle is best understood as a principle with narrow
and limited exceptions. Executing the exceptions for the protection of children, oneself and
others can get out of hand. They can get out of hand in corporate life, no less than personal
life.
In a widely reported case, the San Francisco based Hewlett-Packard Company (HP) hired
private investigators to do some spying. Investigators in three states were authorized to spy
on past and present employees of the firm, several board members, and numerous journalists.
In September 2006, HP Board Chairwoman Patricia Dunn was quoted in a company press
release explaining that the ill-fated spying "was required after the board sought to resolve the
persistent disclosure of confidential information from within its ranks" which could "affect not

only the stock price of HP but also that of other publicly traded companies." The investigators
went too far and Vincent Nye, a company insider, blew the whistle.
The investigators used "pretexting" to find out who was leaking confidential information to the
press. "Pretexting" is impersonating someone else to fraudulently obtain that person's
confidential records and perhaps transact business in that person's name, typically online or
over the phone. In a well-publicized case, a homicidal stalker used information obtained from
Docusearch through pretexting to track down the work address of a woman whom he followed
home and murdered. (25)
HP spies used Social Security numbers and other personal information to set up phony
accounts and obtained telephone records under assumed identities. Identity theft and
pretexting have emerged as major worries now that businesses, government and education
routinely collect and store electronically volumes of sensitive personal data. (26) The scale of
the problem may explain why the HP debacle quickly caught the attention of criminal
prosecutors in California, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and the U.S.
Congress. (27)
HP spying target George Keyworth II admitted that he had made harmless leaks to CNET
Networks Inc. and resigned from the Board, complaining that HP's invasions of his privacy and
others' were "ill-conceived and inconsistent with HP's values." In a nod to corporate ethics,
Dunn admitted that the investigation included "inappropriate techniques," but said the
investigators' methods "went beyond what we understood them to be." To help quell
controversy, Dunn and other company officials resigned after the scandal broke. Ann Baskins
had been general counsel and corporate secretary. She resigned over her role as one of those
who knew about and approved the spying. Ethics officer Kevin Hunsaker resigned--he had also
known about and approved the spying. He had taken part in remarkable conversations
exploring whether methods of intercepting text messages existed since one of the targets on
whom HP wanted to spy preferred text messaging to oral cell phone use.
Like parents and spouses, corporations may in principle be justified in spying to meet
caretaking responsibilities. There is no inherent ethical objection to business managers
ordering fraud and deception investigations that protect investors' bottom lines. (28) But like
parents and spouses, corporations can use methods of spying that go too far. HP cast a wide
net of fraud and deception. Its mistake was not spying per se, but the techniques and extent
of spying. The victims of the HP investigation were adults with legitimate expectations of
privacy in their communications, although suspected of disfavored conduct. Even the
government typically must get a warrant or court order before tapping phones to collect the
phone records sought by HP's pretexting private detectives. Much as Mr. Michael crossed
ethical boundaries by resorting to invading a stranger's home and bedroom to obtain personal
information, HP crossed ethical boundaries through complicity in pretexting to obtain personal
data. Michael might have won custody without invading anyone's privacy. HP might have been
able to plug its leaks without invading privacy, too. Frank conversations, personnel changes
and ethics training might have done the trick. Or, maybe just threatening to cut board
directors' salaries until the leaks stopped would have worked.

5. Protecting the nation
In the United States, official spying is valued as a means of information gathering for both law
enforcement and national security purposes. Domestic and foreign surveillance is common,
and laws have been enacted to regulate the practice of spying. Along with the Fourth
Amendment, these laws honor the spirit of an anti-spying ethic but create a host of realistic
and necessary exceptions to it. The exceptions can seem to gobble up the principle.
But some in government are not content with the generous regime of exceptions won through
the political process. In 2006, U.S. President George W. Bush was widely criticized by
politicians, pundits and civil libertarians for making ad hoc exceptions of his own to
Congressionally-created anti-spying rules. These rules recognize the need for spying in the
interest of protecting national security and the need for safeguards for privacy. Pursuing
exceptions to anti-spying principles can get out of hand in the national arena, much as
exception-making gets out of hand in arenas of corporate and intimate life. Restraint is called
for all around.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) was enacted by Congress to permit,
but regulates covert federal intelligence gathering operations. (29) The Act created a special
top-secret court to review government requests to engage in foreign intelligence-related
spying of the sorts that would otherwise violate legal rights of privacy. (30) Even without
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, a FISA court judge is permitted to
grant authority to spy where there is probable cause that the target of spying is a foreign
power or agent of a foreign power. However, where the target of spying is a U.S. person, a
finding of probable cause of involvement in unlawful espionage must be made.
The FISA requires the government to reveal plans to enter someone's home, and to declare
the intended duration of surveillance. Moreover, the FISA statute contains a requirement to
deal with an inherent risk of spying that I identified earlier: over-collection. Approved FISA
surveillance must be conducted so as to minimize the collection, retention and dissemination
of information about Americans. (31) "Minimization" requirements found in the FISA are also
embodied in the body of law known as Title III. (32) When police have a wiretap warrant they
are required to discontinue listening to conversations that do not relate to the subject-matter
or target of inquiry. The minimization requirement protects privacy in the context of
surveillance.
The FISA was amended by the USA PATRIOT ACT after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
to loosen the requirements of the statute. In 2005, the FISA court received 2,072 foreign spy
requests and all were granted. Spying goes on in the United States under other legal regimes.
Under exceptions to federal financial and communications privacy laws, spying on consumers
can be authorized pursuant to an administrative subpoena, known as a National Security
Letter. The USA PATRIOT ACT, enacted by Congress in October 2001 and reauthorized in
2006, permits the FBI and other agencies to issue National Security Letters requesting
personal information about persons not suspected of a crime and without a warrant. (33) The
recipient of a National Security Letter, such as a library or internet service provider holding

customer data, is forbidden by the PATRIOT ACT to disclose the receipt of a letter. According
to Justice Department officials, 9,254 of these concerning more than 3,000 individuals were
issued by the Justice Department in 2005. (34) Washington Post sources indicate that since
September 11, 2001, as many as 30,000 National Security Letters are being issued each year
by the FBI, "extending the bureau's reach as never before into the telephone calls,
correspondence and financial lives of ordinary Americans." (35) Late in 2005 it came to light
through a New York Times article that even more super-secret spying was going on than
officially reported. President George Bush was side-stepping the FISA Court. The President
authorized the National Security Agency (NSA) to secretly listen to conversations between
U.S. citizens and persons overseas without first obtaining approval of a FISA court judge, as
required by law.
To his many critics, Mr. Bush appeared to flout--in the name of protecting national security-the deeply felt anti-spying ethic reflected in the Fourth Amendment, federal communications
privacy laws and the FISA. Mr. Bush and his lawyers insisted that the unapproved secret
surveillance of U.S. citizens was a lawful extension of his inherent powers as chief executive
and commander-in-chief. The President also claimed that when Congress authorized "the war
on terrorism" through the 2001 Authorization of the Use of Military Force, it implicitly
authorized aggressive covert tactics.
The President lost the political battle. (36) In January 2007, Mr. Bush agreed to cooperate
with the FISA court, under an agreement that promised that the court would handle antiterrorism surveillance requests expeditiously. (37) But the FISA courts always afforded
expedited procedures for urgent requests and total secrecy. The President's secret domestic
spying program had not been justified by the war on terror and an urgent need to protect the
country from a dangerous new enemy. Merely citing the protecting-national-security rationale
did not and should not quiet concerns about unfairly jeopardized privacy.
Conclusion
I have provided examples of spying and examined them from the perspective of a set of ideas
that included an anti-spying principle, a set of exceptions, and a rule of restraint. Government
surveillance and spying are everyday matters, yet private individuals typically hesitate to spy.
U.S. law seeks to honor the anti-spying ethic through a voluminous body of state and federal
privacy law, but permits more and more spying in the name of national security. Hesitation is
the ethically proper modality for all who would spy. Respect for privacy is the particular virtue
of a spy, an ethical limit on both whether and how to act for good.
Secret advantage-taking and privacy-norm violation are part and parcel of spying, pointing to
the need for an anti-spying principle in ethics. However, ethical protection can demand or
permit ethical spying. This makes the case for exceptions. Spying is useful for protecting
children or others in our care who cannot protect themselves; protecting ourselves from
wrongdoers; protecting the company and the investing public; and protecting the nation. To
avert a school massacre, address a child's dangerous obesity, or detect wrongs committed by
a persistently insensitive and untrustworthy spouse, spying is justified.

But ethical protection does not justify exceptions to the anti-spying principle where less
harmful interventions are available and can achieve the same good. Nor is spying "by any
means necessary" the ethical rule, when spying is necessary. "The ends don't justify the
means," as the maxim goes. Before spying, the efficacy of other, ethically less tainted and
risky methods of obtaining the desired information should be ruled out. Even wrongdoers'
expectations of privacy matter prima facie when selecting the means of information gathering,
shaped as they are by the rules of the social game. The unfaithful partner deserves to be
politely confronted concerning the details of the alleged infidelity before, or instead, of being
spied on.
It appears that Mr. Michael, the man who spied on his ex-wife and her partner, did not seek to
have a frank conversation with the women before he resorted to peeping through their
bedroom window. And Mr. Michael, like Hewlett-Packard and President Bush, jumped at
invasive, legally dubious methods of spying. A surgeon who enters the belly is not too free
with her knife. A spy's approach to information-gathering should be surgical, approached
conservatively, and bent on restrained efficacy. Moral authority to spy comes without general
authority to run rough-shod over legal rights, social expectations, and human feelings.
Anita L. Allen
University of Pennsylvania
School of Law
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